On May 4, 2026, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador (CCE) issued a judgment deciding the extraordinary action for protection (AEP) filed by the sectoral ministry (at the time, the Ministry of Energy and Non-Renewable Natural Resources) and the Office of the Attorney General of the State against: (i) the first-instance decision, (ii) the appellate decision, and (iii) the order denying clarification, all issued within a constitutional protection action related to the Río Blanco mining project in the Molleturo parish. The CCE dismissed the AEP and emphasized that this remedy is not a third instance to review the “merits” of the underlying protection action (i.e., the alleged rights violations raised in the original proceedings), but rather an exceptional review of alleged constitutional rights violations that occurred in the course of, or in the judicial decision issued in, the original proceedings.
1. Relevant procedural background and stages of the dispute
The case originated in 2018, when residents and social organizations requested precautionary measures against State authorities to suspend the project due to an alleged omission of prior consultation. The trial court converted the proceeding into a constitutional protection action with a precautionary measure, in line with constitutional precedent, and subsequently issued a first-instance ruling finding a violation of prior consultation and ordering the suspension of activities, the conduct of the consultation, and the gradual demilitarization of the area. On appeal, the Provincial Court confirmed the judgment but reversed the remedy concerning prior consultation, stating that “the people had already been consulted” through Question 5 of the February 4, 2018 referendum. The State entities then filed the AEP against those decisions.
2. Parties, third parties, and procedural participation
Several relevant amici curiae appeared: (i) the Ecuadorian Chamber of Mining, which alleged impacts on effective judicial protection, legal certainty, and reasoning, highlighting the absence of the concession-holder company from the proceedings and the confusion between prior consultation, environmental consultation, and popular consultation; and (ii) other amici focusing on environmental issues, the rights of nature, and social participation. The CCE treated these submissions as context for the debate, without turning the AEP into a substantive review of the project.
3. Jurisdiction and applicable legal framework
The Court asserted jurisdiction under the Constitution (arts. 94 and 437) and the Organic Law on Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control (LOGJCC) (arts. 58, 63, and 191.2.d), recalling that an AEP lies against final judgments or orders when constitutional rights are violated through a judicial act or omission.
4. Key concepts and methodological standards for AEP review
The judgment develops: (i) the specific purpose of the AEP as distinct from the merits of the original case; (ii) the exceptional nature of the remedy and its requirement of constitutional relevance; and (iii) the standard used to determine whether claims are fully and minimally argued. In particular, the CCE reiterates that “claims” must include: a thesis (the right allegedly violated), a factual basis (the judicial act/omission), and a legal justification showing a direct and immediate violation. If these elements are missing, no legal issue is framed and the claim is not examined on the merits.
5. Framed legal issues and screening of claims
The Court notes that several allegations by the State entities were, in essence, attempts to have the CCE re-weigh evidence or reopen factual debates (for example, whether indigenous communities existed or whether environmental consultation was conducted), which pertains to the merits of the original case and falls outside the scope of the AEP. The Court also discards incomplete claims (e.g., alleged omissions by the Provincial Court regarding a measure) due to insufficient legal justification, even after a reasonable interpretive effort.
6. Standing and allegations concerning third-party rights
A key point is that, in part of their claims, the State entities alleged harm to the rights of a third party (the mining company) because it was not part of the proceedings. The CCE recalls that, unlike other public-interest constitutional remedies, the AEP is subject to a stricter rule: only those who were parties to the original case, or should have been, may file it, and the petitioner must allege a violation of its own rights unless there is an express authorization to act as representative. Therefore, the Court does not frame a legal issue based on claims constructed around third-party rights not represented by the State petitioners.
7. Central legal issue: duty to give reasons and “irrelevance”
The CCE refocuses the analysis on the core issue: whether the appellate decision violated the duty to give reasons (art. 76.7.l of the Constitution) by allegedly including “irrelevant” reasons (unrelated to the dispute) or by providing insufficient normative and factual grounding. The Court systematizes its recent case law, including that reasoning must be sufficient both in normative grounding and factual grounding (the “guiding criterion”), and may fail due to absence or insufficiency. It identifies “irrelevance” as the inclusion of reasons that “have nothing to do” with the disputed issue, i.e., lacking a general semantic connection to the final conclusion.
8. Application to the case: why the Provincial Court’s reasoning is considered sufficient
To assess the alleged “irrelevance,” the CCE reviews the rights asserted in the original proceedings and finds that the dispute involved both collective rights (prior consultation) and environmental/nature rights (water, a healthy environment, etc.). Therefore, the Provincial Court’s reasoning regarding ecosystem fragility, protected-area status, and potential impacts on water sources is considered relevant and connected to prior consultation, since that right protects the special relationship between communities and their territories, natural resources, and water sources, and has interdependent environmental and cultural dimensions. The Provincial Court also included direct reasons on prior consultation (noting the absence of consultation and applying art. 57.7 of the Constitution). Accordingly, the CCE concludes that the appellate decision’s reasoning was sufficient and that the duty to give reasons was not violated.
9. Decision and effects
On this basis, the CCE dismisses the extraordinary action for protection in case 2546-18-EP and orders notification, publication, return of the file, and compliance. The judgment was adopted with seven votes in favor and one dissenting opinion.
The judgment includes a dissenting opinion by Constitutional Judge Jorge Benavides Ordóñez, issued subsequently and processed together with the judgment.
10. Exceptions and legal consequences
The CCE clarifies that it may only exceptionally review the merits of the original case in an AEP when strict conditions are met (due process or other rights violations, a prima facie possibility of untutored violations, lack of selection for review, and criteria such as gravity, novelty, relevance, or failure to follow precedent). It also warns that the AEP cannot be used to reopen evidentiary or factual debates and that incomplete claims do not give rise to a legal issue.
11. Prior consultation and environmental consultation
In assessing whether the appellate judgment was sufficiently reasoned, the Constitutional Court held that prior consultation “protects the special relationship” that Indigenous collectives maintain with their territory and, therefore, that prior consultation also entails environmental and cultural protection. On that basis, the Court stated that it would not be appropriate to “sever” the rights of nature or environmental considerations from the examination of the right to prior consultation, and it further noted that ecosystem fragility, protected-area status, or potential impacts on water sources “contribute” to the right to prior consultation, as these are “interdependent” dimensions of that right.
In our view, that line of reasoning used by the Court to conclude that the appellate decision did not suffer from “irrelevance” in its reasoning may be read as blending the distinct purposes of prior consultation (art. 57.7 of the Ecuadorian Constitution) and environmental consultation (art. 398 of the Constitution), because it relies on considerations that are typically addressed under the environmental consultation framework (impacts, protected areas, water sources) as part of the underlying support for prior consultation. This may create a practical risk of conflating different standards, even though the Constitution contemplates separate mechanisms with their own subjects and methodologies, and environmental consultation exists precisely to channel public participation regarding decisions with environmental impacts without replacing prior consultation.
12. Previous decisions stand firm
The judgment does not impose administrative or monetary sanctions on the parties; the main legal consequence is the dismissal of the AEP and the maintenance of the challenged decisions within the constitutional procedural framework.
Therefore, the first-instance judgment remains in force, which found a violation of the right to free, prior and informed consultation and ordered the competent authorities to suspend the extraction activities at the Río Blanco mining project, in addition to ordering remedial measures (including the prior consultation process and the gradual demilitarization of the area).
Likewise, the second-instance judgment also remains in force: it upheld the first-instance decision, but revoked the remedy ordering prior consultation, on the grounds that “the people had already been consulted” through Question 5 of the February 4, 2018 referendum.
This information is a summary of legal developments of interest and therefore cannot be considered as provided advice. If you have any questions, please contact the AVL team.